

# Online Appendix to the Paper: Hosting Media Bias Evidence from the Universe of French Broadcasts, 2002-2020

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## A Data set construction

### A.1 Classifying guests politically

In this section, we provide details on the methodology we use to classify the guests in our sample. We distinguish between politicians on the one hand, and politically-engaged non-politicians, which we call PENOPs, on the other hand.

#### A.1.1 Politicians

To classify the politicians, we use several data sources:

- **Arcadie project.** The Arcadie project is an open data website that gathers information on elected officials. For instance, their age, gender, profession, place of birth, spouse job, electoral district, committee assigned to, social media accounts, etc. We collect data on the group affiliation of MPs. Each year, they are supposed to pay a membership fee to the parliamentary group they are assigned to. Some of them, when they switch party during their term start paying their membership to another group. This is the information we collect. This way we can track the party affiliation of MPs, who are major political figures in the French political landscape.
- **Electoral data.** We then collect election data for several elections: legislative elections (National Assembly), senate elections, European elections, regional elections, departmental elections and municipal elections.<sup>1</sup> If candidates run by lists, we get all the names on the list (European elections for example). One exception are municipal elections. Given some municipalities are very small, the last candidate on a municipal election list almost never gets elected and never appears in the media. In this case, we keep the top 5 candidates of each list in municipalities with at least 100,000 registered voters, and the first on the list for municipalities with at least 20,000 registered voters. For elections, we consider candidates are affiliated to the party whose label they are running with three month before the election date (to account for the campaign period), and three months before the end of the mandate (they might be running again with a different affiliation).
- **Government.** We collect government members (*ministres*, *secrétaires d'état*, and *directeur de cabinet du président*), and consider they are affiliated to the president's party.

Next, for each person in a given month, we search the above mentioned data sets for a political affiliation. We give some data sources precedence over others. The first one is the Arcadie data set, as party affiliation is allowed to change within terms. Next, we use

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<sup>1</sup>*Régions* and *départements* are intermediate tiers of government in France. Municipalities are the lowest.

legislative elections (National Assembly elections), Senate elections, and then whether the person is in the government. Government data comes after legislative and senate elections data because, sometimes, the government includes politicians from distinct adjacent parties. For instance, politicians from the Green party have worked under the socialist president, while not affiliated to the socialist party. We then use other election data sources in the following order: European, regional, departmental, and municipal elections. If some politicians have “holes” in their electoral careers, we extend their past affiliation in the future.

### A.1.2 Politically-engaged non-politicians (PENOPs)

To determine the political leaning (if any) guests who are not politicians, we use data from three different sources: (i) the annual summer meetings organized by political parties (*universités d’été*), (ii) think tank staff and contributors, (iii) endorsements of politicians in op-eds published in the press. Our goal is to collect data on behaviors that we consider, when aggregated, reveal the political leaning of a person. These behaviors are analyzed with a probabilistic model in which the recurrence of such behaviors is considered indicative of a given political leaning.

**Summer meetings of political parties** We collect data on the participants of political party summer meetings. These meetings typically gather politicians and party executives but also academics, media personalities, businessmen, activists, or union representatives. By participant, we here mean people whose name was on the program and who were invited to give a speech or take part in a round table. Although taking part in such events does not imply that the person is affiliated to a party, we consider it is suggestive of the political leaning of a person.

We collect data from various sources. For recent meetings, we retrieve the program on the party website (typically, events from 2021 and sometimes 2020). For older events, we used the Wayback machine search engine (Web archive). We also directly contacted parties and asked them the program of their past meetings. Some answered positively to our requests and shared copies of the programs from their own archives (UMP/LR, Modem and Les Verts/EELV).

Overall, we have an extensive coverage of the French political landscape: close to one hundred programs (n=96), from the radical right to the radical left. It is to be noted, however, that the information was scarcer on the right than on the left: Parti socialiste, Parti communiste and Les Verts/EELV nearly account for 50% of the programs (47, 51 if you include the more recently born LFI), while liberal parties account for 20% of the sample (18 programs for the Modem, UDI and LREM). Meanwhile, important right-wing parties such as FN and UMP/LR account for less than 15% of the sample, with 12 programs retrieved for the two parties combined. As a general observation, summer meetings of left wing parties

are large events directed at a substantial audience, reaching beyond the circle of political activists, hosting hundreds of speakers from the party leadership and civil society; they are also generally held every year. Right wing parties' events are however different. Their audience is mostly restricted to political activists, and sometime include the youth section of the party, with the goal of training young political activists and letting them meet important figures of the party. These parties hold summer meetings less regularly, with many blank years (especially on presidential elections years), and there are less speakers. These discrepancies may be explained by historical and ideological reasons, summer universities or large instructional events being a traditional tool of the progressive political forces to reach a broader audience, as opposed to conservative parties centering on a network of local elites, without needs of propagating their ideology to large segments of the population. For this reason, we also collect data on the summer meetings of smaller right wing parties: *Action Française* (a nationalist and royalist micro-party), *La Manif pour Tous* (a political movement created in opposition to same-sex marriage in 2013 which later transformed in a political party), *Chrétienté-Solidarité* (a Catholic traditionalist political organization close to the National Rally), *Oser la France* (Christian socially and economically conservative political movement), *Renaissance Catholique* (traditionalist catholic political movement), *Acteurs d'Avenir* (Christian organization aimed at educating "tomorrow's Christian leaders"), and *La Convention de la Droite* (a summer meeting organized by radical right politicians to foster alliances with traditional right-wing parties).

- **La France Insoumise** (radical left). 4 summer meetings, 2017-2020. Programs found online.
- **Parti de Gauche** (radical left). 6 summer meetings, 2011-2013, 2015-2017. Online and Wayback machine.
- **Parti Communiste Français** (radical left). 11 summer meetings, 2008, 2009, 2011-2020. Found with the Wayback machine.
- **Europe Ecologie Les Verts** (greens). 20 summer meetings, 2002-2021. Received from party's archivists, and online.
- **Mouvement Républicain Citoyen** (left). 6 summer meetings, 2008-2012, 2014.
- **Les Radicaux de Gauche** (left). 2 summer meetings, 2018-2019. Online.
- **Parti socialiste** (left). 16 summer meetings, 2002-2015 and 2020-2021. Received from the Fondation Jean Jaurès, and found with the Wayback machine
- **Le Vent se Lève** (left). 2 summer meetings, 2018-2019. Online.

- **Mouvement Démocrate** (liberals). 13 summer meetings, 2008-2020. Received from party's archivists, and online.
- **La République En Marche** (liberals). 2 summer meetings, 2019, 2020. Found online.
- **Union des Démocrates et Indépendants** (right). 3 summer meetings, 2018-2020. Obtained from Wayback machine and online.
- **Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle/Les Républicains** (right). 9 summer meetings, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2015, 2017, 2020, 2021. Received from party's archivists.
- **Acteurs d'Avenir** (right). 11 summer meetings, 2010-2015 and 2017-2021. Online and Wayback machine.
- **Osons la France** (radical right). 3 summer meetings, 2018-2020. Online and Wayback machine.
- **La Manif pour Tous** (radical right). 7 summer meetings, 2013-2019. Online and Wayback machine.
- **Chrétienté et Solidarité** (radical right) 10 summer meetings. 2008-2013, 2015, 2016, 2019, 2021. Online and Wayback machine.
- **Front National/Rassemblement National** (radical right). 3 summer meetings, 2011, 2013 and 2016. Found with the Wayback machine.
- **Convention de la droite** (radical right). 1 summer meeting, 2019. Online.
- **Action Française** (radical right). 4 summer meetings, 2017-2019, 2021. Found online.

**Think tanks** Next, we collect data on staff members and contributors of think tanks. Many intellectual figures, pundits, or more generally policy commentators regularly contribute to think tanks publications. These publications can be long and detailed reports, or posts on recent news events on the think tank's website. Our goal is to collect the name of contributors and staff members as, plausibly, choosing to associate one's name with a think tank reflects some form of political alignment.

We start by identifying the main French think tanks. To do so, we start with the list compiled by the Open Think Tank Directory, and sort them according to their number of Twitter followers, as documented in the data set. We focus on think tanks that have more than 5,000 followers, as others are generally really niche. We then discard the think tanks that do not have a web site, or that have no publications. It is the case of, for instance, the *Fondation Danielle-Mitterrand - France Libertés* that mostly raises funds and financially

supports targeted projects. We also discard think tanks that can be assimilated to research centers (INRAE, CERI, etc.) and do not exhibit a particular political leaning, or that are affiliated to an administration (France Stratégie, CEPIL, etc.) as their leaderships change with elections. We also do not consider very recent think tanks, such as *Hémisphère Gauche*, *Institut La Boétie* (both created in 2020). We decided to include all organizations, whether a foundation or a non-profit organization, whose stated goal is to inform the political debate and which, for that purpose, produces reports and (or) organizes conferences. Some of these think tanks are generalists, others focus on economic, geopolitical, judicial or environmental issues for example.

For each think tank, we map them to political parties based on several criteria. First, founders or top management staff are sometimes clearly politically involved. For instance the *Fondapol*'s founder, Jérôme Monod, was the cabinet director of Jacques Chirac, and its current director, Dominique Reynié, is a right-wing elected official. The *Fondation Gabriel-Péri*, named after a communist politician, was created by the Communist Party itself. *Terra Nova* was created by Olivier Ferrand, a Socialist Party executive. Next, we rely on the think tank's own stated goal. For example, *Polemia*, founded by far-right politician Jean-Yves Le Gallou, claims on its "About us" that its work is structured around "identity defense, criticism of oligarchy, and media tyranny," which are typical of the far right rhetoric. ATTAC, a radical left organization, states that it fights for "social and environmental justice and conducts actions against the power of finance and multinational companies," which in this case is ideologically typical of radical left movements. We also study the funding of these think tanks. We have data on which organization members of parliament decided to grant part of their discretionary budget line (known as *réserve parlementaire*) to.<sup>2</sup> Finally, we collect the Twitter handle of each think tank and of members of parliaments. Using simple retweets (retweets without comments), we situate each think tank in the French political space. This is illustrated in Figure A.1. If, with these methods, the political positioning of think tanks is still ambiguous, or if they do not seem to be politicised, then we consider they are not political and do not classify them.

We then collect data on staff members and contributors. For staff members, we use the think tank's web page "Our team" (or the equivalent). Using the Wayback machine, we collect all the names of people on this web page for every year since 2002, or for as many years as possible. For contributors, we scrape publication title, dates and authors. Table D.2 reports the list of think tanks for which we collect data, their creation date and political family. The next two columns present the number of staff members and contributors that we found for each think tank. The same person can be counted several time is she has been part of the staff

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<sup>2</sup>This dataset is called "Reserve Parlementaire" and is available from 2013 to 2017. We look at the party affiliation of the MPs who granted money to think tanks drawing from their own budget line that they can use at discretion for either fund non-profit organizations or local governments.




Figure A.1: Think tanks projected on the French political Twitter space

for several years, or contributed to several publications. For some think tanks, no staff was found. It is the case of Polemia, which does not disclose this information on its website. For some think tanks, there are no contributors (Fondation Copernic, Fondation pour la Nature et l’Homme, and The Shift Project). That is either because all publications are not signed at all, or signed as a team (Copernic). Sometimes, the format of publication being very ad hoc and different each time, we were not able to scrape author names (Fondation pour la Nature et l’Homme and The Shift Project). In the last two columns, the Table reports the number of occurrences of staff members and contributors that were matched with INA data. The figures are always smaller, which is because people never appearing in the media. Overall, we match nearly 9,000 occurrences of staff members, and more than 18,000 occurrences of contributors.

**Endorsements in newspapers** We collect the names of people who signed opinion pieces in newspapers in which they endorse a candidate running in the first round of the presidential elections. Such opinion pieces are generally signed by several persons and detail the reasons why they support a given candidate. We only focus on endorsements published before the first round. Voting decisions as stated between the first and second round of elections might be driven by the willingness to defeat the opponent (especially when a radical right politician qualified in the second round, as in 2002 and 2017), rather than real endorsement of the candidate’s platform and values.

**Combining party meetings, think tanks and endorsements data** We finally combine the data described above in a probabilistic model. Using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, we

place each political family on a left right scale, ranging from 0 to 100. Each behavior (summer meetings attendance, think tank participation, and endorsement) is mapped to a political family, and is attributed a left right score between 0 and 100. For each behavior, we extend it temporally with a decay using an asymmetric Gaussian distribution: its intensity decays very fast before the event, and slowly after. When the intensity slips below a threshold, we consider the individual in unaligned.

When an individual has taken part in events matched to distinct families (for example, attended summer meetings of the Green party, and contributed to a socialist think tank), we compute a decay-weighted average of her left-right placement. In the end, we discretize this left right placement using the midpoint between political families. For example, if in a given month, an individual has a left-right placement of 40, then we consider she belongs to the party whose left-right placement is the closest.

Figure A.2 illustrates the procedure for Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a Green politician who was a member of the European Parliament from 1994 to 2014. The x-axis represents time, the y-axis the left-right scale, from 0 to 100. Yellow lines correspond to the midpoint between political families' left-right placement as computed from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. They define each political family's political space over time. Blue lines are contour lines of the asymmetric Gaussian distributions. Red dots represent the monthly weighted average of the political placement on the left-right scale, and green dots represent the variance of the placement.




Figure A.2: Political classification using endorsements, party events and think tanks

### A.2 Other data on guests

In addition to political classification, we use several data sources to describe guests demographic and professional characteristics.



### A.2.1 INA data

We first use INA data which, for each individual, provide a short description of the guest profession, her gender, her year of birth, and her country. For gender, INA data indicate whether the person is male or female. Table C.5 plots the share of women across seasons, for all appearances, and only for appearances that we classify politically. It has increased between 2002 and 2020, from 18% to 27%.

INA data also provide a short description of guests' age and profession. This information is rather general (“politician” rather than “mayor of Paris” for instance) and not time-varying. If an individual however had several professions during her career, both are generally detailed. For example David Douillet, a judo gold medalist who later became Minister of Sports, has “judoka, politician” listed as profession. We then classify professions into groups by searching keywords in the guest description. A given guest can fall in multiple categories if her description contains keywords corresponding to distinct categories. The categories are the following:

- **Politicians:** “homme politique,” “femme politique,” and “personnalité politique.”
- **Activist:** union leader, think tank director or member, foundation director, NGO director, etc.
- **Media:** any profession related to the media and publishing sector.
  - **Journalist:** journalist, reporter, editor, newspaper director, etc.
  - **Director and producer:** director, producer, assistant producer, film editor (“monteur”), audiovisual technician, etc.
  - **Host**
  - **Opinion:** columnist, critique, etc.
  - **Writer:** writer, novelist, poet, essayist, etc.
  - **Director:** publication director, program director, production director, channel director, etc.
- **Business and finance:** businessman, CEO, market analyst, banker, asset manager, etc.
- **Administration:** senior civil servant (“haut fonctionnaire”), supreme court, diplomat, military officer, judge, magistrate, etc.
- **Entertainment.**
  - **Cinema and theater:** actor, actress, stage director, screenwriter, etc.

- **Music:** singer, musician, songwriter, opera singer, DJ, etc.
  - **Dance:** dancer, choreographer, etc.
  - **Pictorial arts:** painter, photographer, etc.
  - **Festival:** festival director, etc.
  - **Other:** clown, magician, model, Miss France, etc.
- **Sports.**
    - Football
    - Rugby
    - Tennis
    - Cycling
    - Other
  - **Pundits.** It should be noted that people classified with these key words re far from all being academics. Some of them hold PhDs and now work in consulting or think tanks, others for example are described as economist because they have written books about economic issues.
    - **Social sciences and humanities:** economist, sociologist, political scientist, geopolitics specialist, demographer, philosopher, historian, archaeologist, etc.
    - **Hard sciences and medicine:** medical doctor, surgeon, climatologist, physicist, chemist, etc.
  - **Polls and communication:** opinion polls, communication consultant, publicist, etc.

We have data on profession for 88% of appearances, and 81% of guests are classified in at least one category. Figure C.4 depicts the appearance share of guests in each category.

### A.2.2 Wikidata

We also use Wikidata to collect data on people in the INA data set (journalists and guests). We collect data on: date of birth, place of birth, education, profession, employers and citizenship. The procedure is as follows: for each name in our data set (first name and last name), we search Wikidata and get the top 10 results, of which we discard those that are not an instance of “human” (i.e. a book, a place, etc.). For each name, we get between 0 and 10 results.

We then merge each Wikidata search result with the INA dictionary of name (*thesaurus*) and assess match quality. To do so, we create a score. A match’s score is obtained as follows:

- Whether the first name and last name match. While the first Wikidata result might refer to the right person, the second might refer to a sibling or parent. There might be false negatives if the person uses a different name (Léa Salamé vs. Hala Salamé), or only their first name (Arthur, Magloire).
- Whether the birth year matches. Unfortunately, birth year is often missing in INA data.
- Whether the birth year is plausible. We give a higher score to Wikidata matches whose birth year is in the top 90% of the distribution (born after 1937). It helps discard people who have common names and have a homonym in history (military officer in the 19th century, etc.)
- Whether the gender matches.
- Whether the country of citizenship matches.
- Whether there is overlap between, on the one hand Wikidata label and profession strings, and profession in INA data.

For each name, we keep the Wikidata match that has the best score. In case of tie, we keep the highest ranked in the Wikidata search results (likely more famous). We then drop all search results in the bottom decile, as the low score often indicates that most data fields were missing, and assessing the match quality is impossible. Of the about 40,000 with at least 10 appearances that were searched in Wikidata, we find 21,048 valid matches, a fraction of them being journalists.

### A.3 Data on journalists

INA data, as for guests, also provide information on journalists characteristics (gender, year of birth, country). Similarly, we collect data from Wikidata and match it to our data set for both guests and journalists. Because, in the case of journalists, we are particularly interested in their work experience, we additionally collect data from *Les Biographies*.

**Les Biographies** Data on journalists come from the online version of a publication, akin to *Who's Who*, which contains concise biographical information on notable people in France. Each notice generally indicates the date and place of birth, the education and professional career (position, firm, start and end date) of the considered individual.

We focus on hosts and journalists, and for this reason we only retrieve notices of people related to the media industry. To do so, we use a key word search on the *Les Biographies* website using a premium account. The key words refer to channel names or media groups. They are the following: Arte, BFM, BFMTV, C8, Canal +, CNews, Europe 1, France 2,

France 3, France 4, France 5, France Bleu, France Classique, France Culture, France Info, France Inter, France Télévision, I-télé, Groupe Les Echos, Groupe RTL, Groupe TF1, Groupe M6, Lagardère Active, LCI, M6, Mediawan, NextRadioTV, Radio France, RMC, RMC Sport, RTL, TF1, TMC, Vivendi, and W9. We collect the notice content of any person whose description contains at least one of these tokens.

We then focus on the career of these people. For each job entry, we disentangled the firm from the job title, and the classified job titles into several categories.

- Journalists and hosts. This category is broadly defined and refers to all positions related to the media content: journalist, reporter, host, editor, columnist, etc.
- Participants. This category gathers people who regularly participate in shows, typically talk shows or debate shows.
- Top executives. It includes people that have a C-level position in a media outlet (CEO, CFO, etc.). We also create a dummy variables for whether the person was the CEO.
- Others. It generally includes people whose job is neither C-level, nor directly related to content creation, like for instance head of marketing, head of advertising, etc.

As a result, for each person that has a notice on *Les Biographies*, we have his or her professional time line, with the duration of each position, the firm, and the job type. Of course, young hosts or journalists, that rarely appear on screen are less likely to have a *Les Biographies* notice. Overall, we collect data on 5,001 individuals.

## B The French media and political landscape: Detailed Information

As of today in Metropolitan France, there are 30 national digital terrestrial television channels: 7 public channels, 18 free national private channels, and 5 national pay channels. Table B.1 describes these channels.

Table B.1: French national digital terrestrial television channels

#	Channel	Sample			Creation	Ownership		Audience share		
		Main	Core	Free/Pay		2002 (or inception)	2020	2002	2007	2020
1	TF1	Yes	Yes	Free	1935	Bouygues	Bouygues	32.7	30.7	19.2
2	France 2	Yes	Yes	Free	1964	Public	Public	20.8	18.1	14.1
3	France 3	Yes	Yes	Free	1972	Public	Public	16.4	14.1	9.4
4	Canal+	Yes	Yes	Mixed	1984	Canal Plus	Bolloré	3.7	3.4	1.2
5	France 5	Yes	Yes	Free	1986	Public	Public	2.3	3.3	3.5
6	M6	Yes	Yes	Free	1987	Bertelsmann	Bertelsmann	13.2	11.5	9.0
7	Arte	Yes	Yes	Free	1992	Public	Public	1.6	1.8	2.9
8	C8	Yes	Yes	Free	2005	Bolloré	Bolloré	–	0.2	2.6
9	W9			Free	2009	Bertelsmann	Bertelsmann	–	0.9	2.6
10	TMC	Yes	Yes	Free	1954	AB & Bouygues	Bouygues	–	1.2	3.0
11	TFX			Free	2005	AB	Bouygues	–	0.6	1.6
12	NRJ 12			Free	2005	NRJ	NRJ	–	0.4	1.3
13	LCP	Yes	Yes	Free	2000	Public	Public	–	–	–
14	France 4	Yes		Free	2005	Public	Public	–	0.4	1.2
15	BFM TV	Yes		Free	2005	Weill	Altice	–	0.2	2.9
16	CNews	Yes	Yes	Free	1999	Canal Plus	Bolloré	–	0.3	1.4
17	CStar			Free	2005	Lagardère	Bolloré	–	0.4	1.1
18	Gulli			Free	2005	Lagardère & Public	Bertelsmann	–	0.8	1.3
20	TF1 Séries Films			Free	2012	Bouygues	Bouygues	–	–	1.8
21	L'Equipe			Free	1998	Amaury	Amaury	–	–	1.3
22	6ter			Free	2012	Bertelsmann	Bertelsmann	–	–	1.7
23	RMC Story			Free	2012	Diversite TV	Altice	–	–	1.5
24	RMC Découverte			Free	2012	Weill	Altice	–	–	2.3
25	Cherie 25			Free	2012	NRJ Group	NRJ Group	–	–	1.1
26	LCI	Yes	Yes	Free	1994	Bouygues	Bouygues	–	–	1.2
27	Franceinfo			Free	2016	Public	Public	–	–	0.7
41	Paris Première			Pay	1986	Paris & L. des eaux	Bertelsmann	–	–	–
42	Canal+ Cinéma			Pay	1996	Canal Plus	Bolloré	–	–	–
43	Canal+ Sport			Pay	1998	Canal Plus	Bolloré	–	–	–
	Planète+			Pay	1988	Canal Plus	Bolloré	–	–	–
Total sample viewership								90.7	85.2	70.4

**Notes:** Audience data from Mediametrie. Data is missing either when the channel did not exist yet, or when Mediametrie reports did not display the information (mostly for smaller channels).

Our dataset covers the period 2007-2018, and 23 different television and radio channels that we describe in turn in this section. We also provide in this section to give a sense of the relative importance of these different channels aggregate figures on their audience in March 2021.

Table B.2: French radio stations, excluding music only and local stations

Station	Sample		Creation	Ownership		Audience share	
	Main	Core		2002	2020	2003	2020
France Inter	Yes	Yes	1947	Public	Public	9.8	14.7
France Info		Yes	1947	Public	Public	4.9	4.7
France Bleu			1947	Public	Public	5.7	5.8
France Culture	Yes	Yes	1947	Public	Public	–	2.7
RTL	Yes		1933	Bertelsmann	Bertelsmann	11.5	12.6
Europe 1	Yes		1955	Lagardère	Lagardère	7.8	3.9
RMC	Yes		1943	Weill	Altice	2.8	5.3
Radio Classique	Yes		1983	LVMH	LVMH	–	2.4
BFM Business	Yes		1992	Altice	Altice	–	–
Audience share of non-local, non-music only stations						–	54.9
Audience share of our sample						–	50.1

**Notes:** Audience data from Mediametrie.

## B.1 Public broadcasters

In France, there are 9 public television stations: France 2, France 3, France 4, France 5, France Ô, Arte, and LCP-Public Sénat. Our dataset includes information for the FIVE main channels: France 2, France 3, France 4, France 5, and Arte. The audience share of France 2 in March 2021 was 14.4%, the one of France 3 9.1%, and the one of France 4 0.9%.<sup>3</sup>

We also have information for 4 public radio channels: France Bleu, France Culture, France Info and France Inter, which are the four main public radio stations with news programs. The audience share of France Inter in November-December 2020 was 14.7%, the one of France Info 4.7%, and the one of France Bleu in 5.8%. (The remaining channels are , France Musique, Fip, and the Mouv’.)

**Appointment of public media groups directors** The French public broadcasting service is made of “*France Télévisions*” for television on the one hand (i.e. in our dataset France 2, France 3, France 4, France 5, and franceinfo TV), and “*Radio France*” for radio on the other hand (France Culture, France Info, and France Inter). As of today, the heads of “France Télévisions” and of “Radio France” are appointed by the CSA. However, this has not always been the case during our period of interest. Indeed, between 2009 and 2013, a law gave the President of the Republic the task of appointing the president of “France Télévisions”, after receiving the assent of the CSA. This law was strongly criticized for it places the nominally independent public sector media under direct state control. In 2013, this provision was reversed and the authority of the CSA to name the director of “France Télévisions” restored

<sup>3</sup>In comparison, the audience of France 5 was 3.3%; the one of Arte 2.9%.

(see e.g. Benson et al., 2017).

## B.2 Private broadcasters

Regarding private television, our dataset covers all the channels which have at least some news programs, i.e. C8/D8, Canal +, M6, TF1, and TMC.

It excludes those channels whose focus is only on entertainment: CStar that devotes more than 75% of its airtime to music; Gulli, aimed primarily at children aged 4 to 14; NRJ TV mainly devoted to music and culture; TFX; W9 whose airtime is mostly devoted to music; TF1 Séries Films that is dedicated to audiovisual fiction and cinematographic works; L'Equipe that is devoted to sport; 6ter; RMC Story; RM Découverte, a documentary channel dedicated to discovery and knowledge.; and Chérie 25 focused on magazines and documentaries.<sup>4</sup>

Our dataset also includes the 3 24-hour news channels: BFM TV, CNews/I-Télé, LCI, as well as 4 private radio channels broadcasting news programs: Europe 1, RMC, RTL, and Radio Classique. Europe 1, RMC, and RTL are the three private generalist radio services in France.

These different television channels and radio stations have changed hands a number of times during our period of interest. For the sake of the presentation here, we regroup them depending on their shareholder.

**Groupe TF1.** **TF1**, which was a public channel at the time of its creation, became private in 1987 after its acquisition by Bouygues (an industrial group specialized in construction, real estate development, telecommunications, and transportation). As of today, Bouygues owns 43.90% of the channels' capital, the rest of the capital been divided as follows: 28,80% floating stock abroad, 20,00% floating stock in France, and 7,30% for TF1 employees (TF1 shares are listed on the Premier Marché of the Paris Stock Exchange – Euroclear code 005490). The audience share of TF1 in March 2021 was 20.5%.

**LCI** was launched in 1994 on behalf of the media group TF1 as a pay television channel. It became a free channel in 2016. It is still owned by the “Groupe TF1”. The audience share of M6 in March 2021 was 1.1%

The Groupe TF1 also owns the channel **TMC**. Launched in 1954, TMC is selected in 2003 by the CSA to be broadcast free-to-air on preselection No. 10 of the free TNT. This allowed it to obtain maximum coverage of the French territory as soon as it was launched on TNT in 2005. In 2005, the Goupe TF1, together with the Groupe AB (a business group in the field of broadcasting), bought the capital shares owned by Pathé in the channel (80% of the capital, the remaining 20% been owned by the Principality of Monaco. In 2010, the Groupe TF1

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<sup>4</sup>Furthermore, these television stations tend to have a rather low audience: 2.5% for W9; 3% for TMC; 1.6% for TFX; 1.1% for NRJ12; 1.1% for CStart; 1.1% for Gulli; 1.6% for TF1 Séries Films; 1.5% for L'Equipe; 1.5% for 6Ter; 1.4% for RMC Story; 2% for RMC Découverte; 1.2% for Chérie 25.

bought the shares owned by the Groupe AB (a transaction allowed by the CSA). In 2016, the Groupe TF1 finally bought the capital shares owned by the Principality of Monaco and became the unique shareholder of TMC.

**Groupe M6.** **M6** (Métropole Télévision) was launched in 1987. 48.26% of its capital is own by the “SA Immobilière Bayard d’Antin”, i.e. RTL Group (Bertelsmann). The rest of the capital is divided as follows: 7, 24% is owned by the “Compagnie nationale à portefeuille” (a family-owned professional shareholder), and 43.35% corresponds to floating stock. The audience share of M6 in March 2021 was 9.5%

RTL Group (Bertelsmann) also owns the radio station **RTL**.<sup>5</sup> The audience share of RTL in November-December 2020 was 12.6%.

**NextRadioTV.** NextRadioTV, founded in 2000 by Alain Weill, is a company consisting of BFM TV and RMC. In 2015, Altice (a multinational telecommunications corporation founded and headed by Patrick Drahi, and the parent company of SFR) bought 49% of NextRadioTV, 51% of the capital been still held by Alain Weill.<sup>6</sup> In 2016, SFR Group / Altice took exclusive control of Groupe News Participations, which holds 99.7% of NextRadioTV’s capital (a transaction permitted in 2017 by the competition authority<sup>7</sup> and approved in 2018 by the CSA).

**BFM TV** was launched in 2005 by NextRadioTV. As of today, 100% of the capital of BFM TV is owned by NextRadioTV whose 99.7% of the capital is owned directly or indirectly by the company “Groupe News Participations” (GNP), 99.7% of the capital of the latter being owned by “Altice Content Luxembourg”, i.e. SFR (Patrick Drahi). The audience share of BFM TV in March 2021 was 2.8%

NextRadioTV also fully owns the private radio station **RMC**. RMC, founded in 1943, was bought in 2001 by NextRadioTV. The audience share of RMC in November-December 2020 was 6.1%.

**Groupe Canal Plus.** As of today, the “Groupe Canal Plus” is made of the following television channels: Canal+, C8, and CNews.<sup>8</sup> A limited company, the “Groupe Canal Plus” is itself 100% owned by Vivendi. Since 2015, the “Groupe Bolloré” (with Vincent Bolloré) is

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<sup>5</sup>Founded in 1933 as Radio Luxembourg, the station’s name was changed to RTL in 1966. It broadcast from outside France until 1981, because only public stations had been allowed until then. In 1981, privately run radio stations were allowed to broadcast in France and RTL has since then broadcast in France.

<sup>6</sup>As part of this operation, two new companies were created: one the one hand, News Participation, which owns NextRadioTV – 51% controlled by Alain Weill and 49% by Altice –, and on the other hand, Altice content, whose goal is to invest in media companies.

<sup>7</sup>décision n° 17-DCC-76 en date du 13 juin 2017.

<sup>8</sup>As well as CStar that is not included in our sample given it is not a generalist channel.



the main shareholder of Vivendi with 26.28% of the capital (all the other shareholders own less than 5% of the capital).

**C8** (formerly Direct 8 – D8) was launched in 2005 by Vincent Bolloré<sup>9</sup>, and bought by the “Groupe Canal Plus” in 2011. As of today, 100% of the capital of C8 is owned by the “Groupe Canal Plus”. The audience share of C8 in March 2021 was 2.7%.

**CNews** (formerly I-Télé), a 24-hour news channel, was launched in 1999 by the “Groupe Canal Plus”. Initially a subscription-based television services, it is transformed into a free channel as of its arrival on French digital terrestrial television in October 2005. 99.8% of CNews is owned by the “Groupe Canal Plus SA” (the remaining 0.20% been owned by Canal+ Finance SA). The audience share of France 2 in March 2021 was 1.9%.

**Canal+** was launched in 1984 as the first French premium television (and the first private national television company.<sup>10</sup>) At the time of its launch, its main shareholder was the “Groupe Havas”, a publicly-traded company whose main shareholder was the State itself. The capital share owned by Havas – the company was privatized in 1987 – in Canal Plus progressively decreased, and in 1987 the channel was listed on the stock exchange. At the time, its two main shareholders were Havas and the Compagnie Générale des Eaux.<sup>11</sup>

The audience share of Canal+ in March 2021 was 1.1% (but remind that Canal+ is a premium television channel).

**Europe 1** Europe 1 is a privately owned radio station created in 1955, owned and operated by Lagarère since 1974 (Lagarère SCA at the beginning of the period, Lagarère Active as of today). The audience share of Europe 1 in November-December 2020 was 3.9%.

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<sup>9</sup>The official creation of the channel took place in 2001, with a number of tests. It was officially launched in 2005 with the “Télévision numérique terrestre” – digital terrestrial television platform.

<sup>10</sup>In 1984, the government initially granted Canal-Plus a public service concession for twelve years. The concession was renewed in 1994.

<sup>11</sup>More precisely, in 1984, more than 60 percent of the capital of the channel was held by state-controlled shareholders: Havas (42.13%) and nationalized banks (the Société Générale, the Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), the Crédit Lyonnais, the Crédit Commercial de France (CCF), and the Banque Régionale d’Escompte et de Dépôt (Bred), 18.18 % in all).The other (private) shareholders were the Compagnie générale des eaux, L’Oréal, the Garantie Mutuelle des Fonctionnaires (GMF) (5%) and the regional daily newspaper *Ouest-France* (1.66%). Agence Havas, while remaining the largest shareholder in Canal Plus, held only 25% of its capital at the end of March 1986, through a number of capital increases and the sale of 12.5% of its shares. Furthermore, thanks to a capital increase, Perrier became a shareholder in 1986 with 5% of the capital, as well as Gilbert Gross’s SGGMD (5%), the British group Granada (3%), and the Compagnie Financière Saint-Germain (2%), a holding company. In March 1986, the Compagnie Générale des Eaux (CGE) was still the leading private partner of the channel with 15.65% of its capital. It was followed by L’Oréal (10.41%), the Société Générale (10%), the Garantie Mutuelle des Fonctionnaires (GMF) (5.21%) and a group of banks (12.5%). The balance is held by various mutual funds and regional press groups associated with the creation of Canal Plus from the outset. In 1987, the CGE has strengthened its position in the capital of Canal Plus, increasing its capital share from 15.65% to 21.49% (through the purchase of the 5.21% of the shares held by the GMF and the acquisition of the shares (0.63%) of the Bred). At the time Canal Plus went public (in November 1987), its main shareholder were Havas (24.23%), CGE (20.72%), L’Oréal (7.7%), Société Générale (8.08%), CCF (6.82%), and Perrier (5%).

**Radio Classique** Launched in 1983 by Christian Pellerin,, Radio Classique broadcast mainly classical music, but also segments of economic and political news. In 1986, the station was 25% owned by RTL and 75% by the real estate company Lucia (a land holding company created by Christian Pellerin). In 1992, Pellerin sold Radio Classique to Sagem, a group specialized in professional and military electronics. In 1999, Desfossés International, a subsidiary of Bernard Arnault’s group, LVMH (and media division of LVMH), bought 100% of the capital of Radio Classique. In 2000, Desfossés International became DI Group.<sup>12</sup> In 2008, as a result of the buyout of the economic daily *Les Echos* Bernard Arnault, DI Group is renamed “Groupe les Echos” (with Nicolas Beytout as the CEO).

Note that all the private television channels have to establish a convention with the CSA.

### B.3 Changes in media ownership

**Bouygues Group buys AB Group’s shares of TMC in 2009.** In 2005, TMC is sold to Bouygues Group and AB Group, each of them holding 40% of TMC. In December 2006, Bouygues bought 33.5% of the shares of AB Group. A clause in the 2006 agreement ensured that TF1 could not buy TMC. This clause expired in April 2009. In May 2009, TF1 announces that it is negotiating with AB group to buy its 40% of TMC. In January 2010, the competition authority approves the transaction. TF1, with 80% of the shares, has control over TMC.<sup>13</sup>

**Bolloré sells Direct 8 to the Canal Plus Group in 2011.** In September 2011, Canal Plus Group (owned by Vivendi) announces the acquisition of 60% of the television branch of the Bolloré Group, which owns Direct 8 (which will later be named D8 and C8). The Bolloré Group is paid in Vivendi shares. In exchange for the 60% of its television channels, the Bolloré television obtained 1.7% of the Vivendi Group, which owns of the Canal Plus Group. As a result the Bolloré Group owns 4.41% of Vivendi shares. The transaction is approved by the CSA and the Competition Agency in September 2012. Direct 8 is renamed D8.<sup>14</sup>

**Bolloré takes over the Canal Plus Group in 2015.** At the beginning of 2015, the Bolloré Group had 5.1% of the shares in the Vivendi Group, a publicly traded company that owns the Canal Plus channels (Canal +, D8 and I-Télé). Vincent Bolloré, at the head of the Bolloré Group had been a chairman of the surveillance committee of Vivendi since June 2014. On March 26th 2015, the Bolloré Group registered more than 10% of the shares in Vivendi. In April 2015, it had raised its equity up to 14.4%. Mid-April, Vincent Bolloré obtained during

<sup>12</sup>Bernard Arnault bought Desfossés International (that edited the financial dailies *La Tribune* and *l’Agefi*) in 1994.

<sup>13</sup><https://www.lesechos.fr/2010/06/reperes-le-rachat-de-tmc-et-nt1-par-tf1-440812>

<sup>14</sup>[https://www.challenges.fr/high-tech/bollore-a-4-41-de-vivendi-apres-la-vente-de-direct-8-a-canal\\_260850](https://www.challenges.fr/high-tech/bollore-a-4-41-de-vivendi-apres-la-vente-de-direct-8-a-canal_260850), <https://investir.lesechos.fr/actions/actualites/canal-achete-60-de-direct-8-et-direct-star-a-bollore-370> php, <https://www.capital.fr/entreprises-marches/nouveau-feu-vert-de-la-concurrence-au-rachat-de-d8-par-canal-922>

the general meeting of shareholders with more than two thirds of votes that a French law doubling the vote shares of long-term owners applies.<sup>15</sup> In exchange for this approval, he had promised extra dividends. As a result of the vote, the Bolloré Group obtained about 26% of the vote shares, making it the reference shareholder. In July 2015, he named Maxime Saada CEO of the Canal Plus Group.<sup>16</sup>

**Altice gradually takes control of NextRadioTV from 2015.** NextRadioTV is publicly-traded group owning the television channels BFM TV, RMC Sport and RMC Story as well as the radio stations RMC and BFM Radio. It was created by Alain Weill in 2005, who owned 37.8% of its capital and 48.6% of the vote share at the beginning of 2015. In July 2015, he announces a “strategic partnership” with Patrick Drahi, a long-standing business partner. Patrick Drahi owns Altice, a group that includes SFR (a mobile telecommunication company), Numericable (a cable operator and telecommunication company) and Altice Content (Libération, L’Express, Strategies, Mieux Vivre Votre Argent, L’Expansion). They create a holding named News Participation, controlled at 51% by Alain Weill and at 49% by Altice Contents. This holding will become the new owner of NextRadioTV. In exchange, Alain Weill obtains 24% of Altice Content. In February 2016, News Participation owns more than 97% of NextRadioTV. In June 2017, the Competition Authority approves the takeover, the CSA in April 2018. In November 2017, Alain Weill becomes the CEO of Altice France, which includes Altice Content and, therefore, NextRadioTV.<sup>17</sup> As a result, although NextRadioTV is now owned by Altice (Drahi), its CEO, Alain Weill, has remained in control all along, as he now the CEO of the Altice branch that owns NextRadioTV.

## B.4 Regulatory background

Regarding the presidential election, we need to distinguish between the so-called *intermediate period* (from the publication of candidate lists to official start date of the campaign) and the thirty-day official campaign itself (two weeks for the first round, then another two for the second round). The official campaign begins on the second Monday preceding the first

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<sup>15</sup>This law, also named Loi Florange, voted in 2014, aimed at favoring long-term firm ownership rather than speculation by opportunistic shareholders.

<sup>16</sup><https://www.bolllore.com/bollo-content/uploads/2018/01/03-26-15-bolllore-vivendi.pdf>, <https://www.bolllore.com/bollo-content/uploads/2018/12/bolllore-rs-2015.pdf>, <https://www.lesechos.fr/2015/04/bolllore-continue-de-monter-en-puissance-dans-le-capital-de-vivendi-247478>, <https://www.lesechos.fr/2015/04/chez-vivendi-vincent-bolllore-paracheve-sa-prise-de-pouvoir-258929>, <https://www.lopinion.fr/edition/economie/comment-vincent-bolllore-prend-control-e-vivendi-petite-porte-105199>, [https://www.challenges.fr/entreprise/vivendi-cette-ag-qui-pourrait-porter-bolllore-au-pouvoir\\_67801](https://www.challenges.fr/entreprise/vivendi-cette-ag-qui-pourrait-porter-bolllore-au-pouvoir_67801).

<sup>17</sup><https://www.reuters.com/article/nextradiotv-altice-idFRL5N10713P20150727>, <https://www.strategies.fr/actualites/medias/1021127W/alain-weill-et-patrick-drahi-s-associent-pour-racheter-nextradio-tv.html>, [https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2015/07/27/le-groupe-de-patrick-drahi-se-positionne-pour-racheter-4700363\\_3234.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2015/07/27/le-groupe-de-patrick-drahi-se-positionne-pour-racheter-4700363_3234.html), <https://www.autoritedelaconurrence.fr/fr/communiqués-de-presse/13-juin-2017-medias>

round of voting and comes to a halt at midnight on the eve of the ballot. It then resumes on the day when the two front-runners are announced and comes to a final halt at midnight on the eve of the second round. Today, the principle of “equitable” speaking time prevails during the intermediate period.<sup>18</sup> Under the supervision of the CSA, the speaking time of the various parties during the “intermediate” campaign must reflect the extent to which they are representative of the French political landscape, as well as their capacity to demonstrate their intention to run candidates. There are three criteria of a party’s “representativeness”: its results in the most recent elections; the number and position of elected officials that it claims to have; and the evidence of opinion polls.<sup>19</sup> The official campaign, on the other hand, operates in accordance with the principle of “equal speaking time” for the candidates.

As to parliamentary elections, the French electoral code stipulates that – for the broadcasting of video clips – the parties with formally constituted groups in the National Assembly shall together have a total of three hours for the first round, while parties without such groups may each have seven minutes’ broadcasting time provided they can show that at least seventy-five candidates are running in their name.

## B.5 Political landscape

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<sup>18</sup>The organic law of April 25, 2016, updated the rules governing presidential elections, including the allocation of speaking time. Previously, strict equality had been stipulated for candidates and their supporters throughout the “intermediate” period, which was naturally advantageous to the “smallest” campaigns. (Note, however, that this strict equality related only to speaking time, not to total airtime, and that the latter included TV and radio editorial material on candidates and their supporters.) On the rules governing pluralism during and outside election periods, see the information available on the CSA website, <https://www.csa.fr>.


<sup>19</sup>See the CSA recommendation no. 2016-2 of September 7, 2016 to the radio and television services for the presidential elections: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000033104095&categorieLien=id>.

Table B.3: Main Political Parties


Party	Ideology	L-R general	L-R economics	L-R social
Parti Communiste Français	Radical left	1.1	1.1	3.8
La France Insoumise	Radical Left	1.7	1.1	2.4
Europe Ecologie-Les Verts	Greens	2.5	1.9	1.6
<b>Parti Socialiste</b>	Socialists	3	3.1	2.8
Mouvement Démocrate	Liberal	6.1	6.2	4.5
<b>La République En Marche</b>	Liberal	6.3	6.3	3.2
<b>Les Républicains</b>	Conservatives	7.9	8.1	6.9
Debout la France	Radical Right	9	7	8.3
Front National	Radical Right	9.6	5.9	8.9

**Notes:** L-R values are drawn from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and range from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). When available, 2019 data is used, 2014 otherwise. L-R general corresponds to a general placement on a left-right scale from 0 to 10. L-R economics refers to the party’s ideological stance on economic issues such as privatization, taxes, regulation, etc. Parties on the economic left advocate for the government taking an active role in the economy, the right, a reduced role. L-R social corresponds to the variables “galtan”, the party positioning on social and cultural values, from 0 - Libertarian or postmaterialists in favor of the expansions of personal freedoms to 10 - Traditional or authoritarian in favor of order, tradition and stability. The political parties in bold are those that have been in power at least once over the past two decades.


## C Additional figures




(a) Distribution of daily data coverage (hours)



(b) Average daily coverage - Radio stations




(c) Average daily coverage - Historical TV channels




(d) Average daily coverage - Other TV channels

**Notes:** The descriptive statistics are produced using INA data for television channels and radio stations, from 2002 to 2020. Panel (a) shows the distribution of the daily coverage in hours. The number of hours sometimes exceeds 24 due to shows ending after midnight. Panel (b), (c) and (d) depict the yearly average of the data coverage in hours per day for each radio station (b) and television channel (c and d).

Figure C.1: Data coverage of television and radio shows




(a) All programs



(b) Excluding programs starting between 11pm and 5am

**Notes:** “P” refers to Plurimedia data, and “I” refers to INA data. The vertical bars show the breakdown of programs by type for the 14 channels in our sample. Bars denoted “P” depict the time dedicated to programs of each category, divided by the total screen time in the considered semesters as documented in Plurimedia data. Bars denoted “I” depict the time dedicated to programs of each category in INA data, divided by the total screen time in the corresponding categories in Plurimedia data. Shorter “I” bars reflect that some shows are not documented in INA data.


Figure C.2: Data coverage comparison between Plurimedia data and INA data



**Notes:** The figure depicts the number of appearances, the number of distinct guests (left axis), and the total screen time of guests by seasons (right axis). The sample include the 22 television and radio stations of our sample.


Figure C.3: Number of appearances, number of guests, and screen time of guests, per season






**Notes:** The figure plots the profession of the invited guests a a share of the appearances. The data covers the time period ranging from January 1st 2002 to December 31st 2020. It includes the following 14 television channels: TF1, France 2, France 3, Canal+, France 5, M6, ARTE, C8/D8, TMC, France 4, BFM TV, I-Télé/CNews, LCI, LCP/Public Sénat, and 8 radio stations: France Inter, France Info, France Culture, and RTL, RMC, Europe 1, Radio Classique, and BFM Business.

Figure C.4: Guests of the shows: Profession, 2002-2020




**Notes:** The figure plots share of guest appearances who are marked as women in the INA data. The continuous line reports this share among all appearances, and the dashed line among the guests who are politically classified.

Figure C.5: Evolution of the share of women among the guests, 2002-2020




**Notes:** The Figure plots the distribution of the profession of the non journalist hosting shows, as a share of the total number of appearances. The time period is 2002-2020.

Figure C.6: Profession of the non journalist hosting shows (2002-2020), as a share of the total number of appearances




**Notes:** The Figure plots the number of unique shows each journalist/presenter hosts during our time period (2002-2020), with bins equal to 2. The number of programs variable is winsorized at the 99th percentile (325) programs.

Figure C.7: Number of unique programs each journalist hosts (2002-2020)




**Notes:** The Figure plots the number of unique journalists/presenters per season. Time period is September 2005 - August 2019.

Figure C.8: Number of unique journalists per season




**Notes:** The Figure plots the number of unique shows each journalist/presenter hosts during the sub-period 2006-2018, with bins equal to 2. The number of programs variable is winsorized at the 99th percentile (325) programs.

Figure C.9: Number of unique programs each journalist hosts (2006-2018)



**Notes:** The Figure reports the distribution of the number of journalists depending on the number of different channels on which they appear between 2006 and 2018.


Figure C.10: Number of different channels on which the hosts appear (2006-2018)



**Notes:** The Figure reports the distribution of the number of journalists depending on the number of different channels on which they appear between 2002 and 2020.


Figure C.11: Number of different channels on which the journalists appear (2002-2020)






**Notes:** The Figure reports the distribution of the number of journalists depending on the number of different channels on which they appear in a given season. Time period is September 2005 - August 2019.

Figure C.12: Number of different channels on which the journalists appear in a given season




**Notes:** The Figure reports the distribution of the number of journalists depending on the number owners for which they work in a given season. Time period is September 2005 - August 2019.

Figure C.13: Number of different owners for which the journalists work in a given season




**Notes:** The Figure depicts the share of appearances of guests that fall in a political category. Among those who are classified, some are classified with direct evidence of political engagements: they were candidates in elections with a party label or were part of a government (dark blue). Others are classified using more indirect signs of political involvement: candidate endorsements in the first round of presidential elections, participation in party events, or contribution to think tanks (green). For some guests, we have both direct and indirect signs of political engagements (light blue), in which case we prioritize direct evidence of political involvement. See the text for more details.

Figure C.14: Political classification of the guests, 2002-2020




**Notes:** This figure plots the speaking time share of guests who are politically classified and not politically over time. Among those who are classified, some are classified with direct evidence of political engagements: they were candidates in elections with a party label, or were part of a government (dark blue). Others are classified using more indirect signs of political involvement: candidate endorsements in the first round of presidential elections, participation in party events, or contribution to think tanks (green). For some guests, we have both direct and indirect signs of political engagements (light blue), in which case we prioritize direct evidence of political involvement.

Figure C.15: Appearances of guests: Evolution over time




**Notes:** The Figure depicts the share of appearances of guests that fall in a political category. Among those who are classified, some are classified with direct evidence of political engagements: they were candidates in elections with a party label, or were part of a government (dark blue). Others are classified using more indirect signs of political involvement: candidate endorsements in the first round of presidential elections, participation in party events, or contribution to think tanks (green). For some guests, we have both direct and indirect signs of political engagements (light blue), in which case we prioritize direct evidence of political involvement.

Figure C.16: Appearances of guests: Depending on the channels – Public TV channels, 2002-2020




**Notes:** The Figure depicts the share of appearances of guests that fall in a political category. Among those who are classified, some are classified with direct evidence of political engagements: they were candidates in elections with a party label, or were part of a government (dark blue). Others are classified using more indirect signs of political involvement: candidate endorsements in the first round of presidential elections, participation in party events, or contribution to think tanks (green). For some guests, we have both direct and indirect signs of political engagements (light blue), in which case we prioritize direct evidence of political involvement.

Figure C.17: Appearances of guests: Depending on the channels – Private TV generalist channels



**Notes:** The Figure depicts the share of appearances of guests that fall in a political category. Among those who are classified, some are classified with direct evidence of political engagements: they were candidates in elections with a party label, or were part of a government (dark blue). Others are classified using more indirect signs of political involvement: candidate endorsements in the first round of presidential elections, participation in party events, or contribution to think tanks (green). For some guests, we have both direct and indirect signs of political engagements (light blue), in which case we prioritize direct evidence of political involvement.


Figure C.18: Appearances of guests: Depending on the channels – Private TV news channels, 2002-2020



**Notes:** The Figure depicts the share of appearances of guests that fall in a political category. Among those who are classified, some are classified with direct evidence of political engagements: they were candidates in elections with a party label, or were part of a government (dark blue). Others are classified using more indirect signs of political involvement: candidate endorsements in the first round of presidential elections, participation in party events, or contribution to think tanks (green). For some guests, we have both direct and indirect signs of political engagements (light blue), in which case we prioritize direct evidence of political involvement.


Figure C.19: Appearances of guests: Depending on the channels – Radio, 2002-2020






**Notes:** The figure plots the difference (in percentage points) between the speaking time share devoted to each political family (as reported in Figure 4d) and the share of elected politicians (MPs + senators) represented by each political family. When the difference is positive, it means that, in relative terms, the political family is overrepresented in the media compared to its political importance; when the difference is negative, it means that it is under-represented. The data covers the time period ranging from September 1st 2006 to August 31st 2018. It includes the following 14 television channels: TF1, France 2, France 3, Canal+, France 5, M6, ARTE, C8/D8, TMC, France 4, BFM TV, I-Tél é/CNews, LCI, LCP/Public Sénat, and 8 radio stations: France Inter, France Info, France Culture, RTL, RMC, Europe 1, Radio Classique, and BFM Business.

Figure C.20: Difference between the media coverage and the share of elected politicians, depending on the years




**Notes:** The figure plots the difference (in percentage points) between the speaking time share devoted to each political family (as reported in Figure 4d) and the popularity of the political families as proxied by the polls for the presidential elections. When the difference is positive, it means that, in relative terms, the political family is overrepresented in the media compared to its popularity; when the difference is negative, it means that it is under-represented. The data covers the time period ranging from September 1st 2006 to August 31st 2008. It includes the following 14 television channels: TF1, France 2, France 3, Canal+, France 5, M6, ARTE, C8/D8, TMC, France 4, BFM TV, I-Tél é/CNews, LCI, LCP/Public Sénat, and 8 radio stations: France Inter, France Info, France Culture, RTL, RMC, Europe 1, Radio Classique, and BFM Business.


Figure C.21: Difference between the media coverage and the popularity of the political families as proxied by the polls, depending on the seasons




(a) Only politicians – All time periods



(b) Only politicians – Dropping mandatory speaking time for government




(c) All politically-classified guests – All time periods



(d) All politically-classified guests – Dropping mandatory speaking time for government


**Notes:** The data covers the time period ranging from September 1st 2006 to August 31st 2008. It includes the following 14 television channels: TF1, France 2, France 3, Canal+, France 5, M6, ARTE, C8/D8, TMC, France 4, BFM TV, I-Tél é/CNews, LCI, LCP/Public Sénat, and 8 radio stations: France Inter, France Info, France Culture, RTL, RMC, Europe 1, Radio Classique, and BFM Business. Speaking time is aggregated at the season level, that is from September 1st to June 30th.

Figure C.22: Evolution of the speaking time of the guests, depending on their political affiliation – Weighting the speaking time share by the average audience of the time slot




**Notes:** The Figure reports the share of surveyed individuals who report they have used the media to access news. The data come from the Reuters Institute's *Digital News Report* and is described in details in the text. The drop in 2020 for the public radio is linked to the strike that took place at Radio France (public radio) from November 2019 to February 2020, the longest strike in the radio history.

Figure C.23: Share of surveyed individuals who report they have used the media to access news




**Notes:** The Figure plots the average political preferences of the audience of the different television channels / radio stations in our data. The data come from the Reuters Institute's *Digital News Report* and is described in details in the text.


Figure C.24: Political preferences of the audience




(a) Radical left




(b) Greens




(c) Left



(d) Liberals




(e) Right



(f) Radical right


**Notes:** each sub-figure plots the channel fixed effects obtained when estimating the following model:  $\text{political slant}_{s,c,t} = X_s\beta + \gamma_c + \theta_t + \epsilon_{s,c,t}$  (see the text for details). In Figure C.25a, political slant<sub>s,c,t</sub> is the speaking time share of the radical left, the one of the greens in Figure C.25b, the left in Figure C.25c, the liberals in Figure C.25d, the right in Figure C.25e, and the radical right in Figure C.25f. Channels are sorted according to these estimates. Speaking time shares calculated in appearances of guests among all the guests, and only the politicians are classified as politically involved (the PENOPs are excluded). The omitted channel (reference point) is France 2. The data covers the time period ranging from January 1st 2002 to December 31st 2020.

Figure C.25: Channel-level slant – Speaking time shares calculated in appearances of guests among all the guests (only politicians), 2002-2020



**Notes:** each sub-figure plots the channel fixed effects obtained when estimating the following model:  $\text{political slant}_{s,c,t} = X_s\beta + \gamma_c + \theta_t + \epsilon_{s,c,t}$  (see the text for details). In Figure C.26a, political slant<sub>s,c,t</sub> is the speaking time share of the radical left, the one of the greens in Figure C.26b, the left in Figure C.26c, the liberals in Figure C.26d, the right in Figure C.26e, and the radical right in Figure C.26f. Channels are sorted according to these estimates. Speaking time shares calculated in appearances of guests among all the guests, and only the PENOPs are classified as politically involved (the politicians are excluded). The omitted channel (reference point) is France 2. The data covers the time period ranging from January 1st 2002 to December 31st 2020.


Figure C.26: Channel-level slant – Speaking time shares calculated in appearances of guests among all the guests (only PENOPs), 2002-2020




**Notes:** each sub-figure plots the channel fixed effects obtained when estimating the following model:  $\text{political slant}_{s,c,t} = X_s\beta + \gamma_c + \theta_t + \epsilon_{s,c,t}$  (see the text for details). In Figure C.27a, political slant<sub>s,c,t</sub> is the speaking time share of the radical left, the one of the greens in Figure C.27b, the left in Figure C.27c, the liberals in Figure C.27d, the right in Figure C.27e, and the radical right in Figure C.27f. Channels are sorted according to these estimates. Speaking time shares calculated in appearances of politically-classified guests, and only the politicians are included. The omitted channel (reference point) is France 2. The data covers the time period ranging from January 1st 2002 to December 31st 2020.

Figure C.27: Channel-level slant – Speaking time shares calculated in appearances of politically-classified guests (including only the politicians), 2002-2020







(a) Radical left




(b) Greens




(c) Left



(d) Liberals



(e) Right



(f) Radical right

**Notes:** each sub-figure plots the channel fixed effects obtained when estimating the following model: political slant<sub>s,c,t</sub> = X<sub>s</sub>β + γ<sub>c</sub> + θ<sub>t</sub> + ε<sub>s,c,t</sub> (see the text for details). In Figure C.28a, political slant<sub>s,c,t</sub> is the speaking time share of the radical left, the one of the greens in Figure C.28b, the left in Figure C.28c, the liberals in Figure C.28d, the right in Figure C.28e, and the radical right in Figure C.28f. Channels are sorted according to these estimates. Speaking time shares calculated in appearances of politically-classified guests, and only the politicians are included. The omitted channel (reference point) is France 2. The data covers the time period ranging from January 1st 2002 to December 31st 2020.

Figure C.28: Channel-level slant – Speaking time shares calculated in appearances of politically-classified guests (including only the PENOPs), 2002-2020

Figure C.29: Changing slant over time, Private television channels






Figure C.30: Changing slant over time, Public radio stations



(a) France Inter



(b) France Inter



**Notes:** The figure plots the channel fixed effects obtained for CNews/I-télé when estimating the following model:  $\text{political slant}_{s,c,t} = X_s\beta + \gamma_c + \theta_t + \epsilon_{s,c,t}$  independently for each season (see the text for details). Speaking time shares are calculated in appearances of politically-classified guests (only the politicians are included). The omitted channel (reference point) is France 2.

Figure C.31: The changing slant of CNews/I-télé – Evolution of the relative speaking time share devoted to radical-right guests (including only the politicians) in appearances of politically-classified guests (compared to France 2)

Figure C.32: Event study coefficients of the effect of the Bolloré takeover on far right time share



**Notes:** The figure reports event study estimates adapted from Equation 2. The outcome is the The sample used include the 3 Bolloré television channels and the 3 radio stations for which we have good data coverage until 2020. Standard errors are clustered at the channel level. Time shares are weighted by the average audience of television and radio for the corresponding time slot. Political family time shares are computed as a proportion of the total time of politically classified guests. \* 10%, \*\* 5%, \*\*\* 1%.

## D Additional tables

Table D.1: Summary statistics: Journalists

	Mean	St.Dev	P25	Median	P75	Max
<b>Demographics</b>						
=1 if journalist is female	0.33	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.00	1
Date of birth	1959	16	1949	1960	1970	2005
=1 if born in Paris	0.18	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	1
<b>Education</b>						
=1 if highest degree is bachelor	0.14	0.35	0.00	0.00	0.00	1
=1 if highest degree is master	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	1.00	1
=1 if highest degree is PhD	0.08	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	1
=1 if journalism school	0.08	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	1
=1 if Business school	0.01	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	1
=1 if Sciences Po	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	1
=1 if Engineering school	0.02	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	1
=1 if ENA	0.05	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.00	1
Observations	72,766					

**Notes:** The table represents summary statistics on all journalists for which we have information from at least one of the following sources: INA, Les Biographies or Wikidata.

Table D.2: Think tanks staff and contributors: descriptive statistics

Name	Creation	Family	Number found		Once merged with INA data	
			Staff	Contributor	Staff	Contributor
Fondation Gabriel Peri	2004	Radical left	373	814	238	447
ATTAC	1998	Radical left	1,029	2,708	807	1,857
Fondation Copernic	1998	Radical left	1,898	–	1,292	–
Les Economistes Atterres	2011	Radical left	458	210	335	188
Fondation pour la nature et l’homme	1990	Greens	1,295	–	817	–
Fondation de l’ecologie politique	2012	Greens	412	53	348	36
Fondation Jean Jaures	1992	Left	878	3,904	634	2,728
Institut Jacques Delors	1996	Left	429	1,793	334	1,098
Republique des Idées	2002	Left	123	121	95	118
Fondation Res Publica	2005	Left	590	82	479	65
Terra Nova	2008	Left	1,488	1,392	1,117	861
The Shift Project	2010	Left	287	–	110	–
Fabrique de l’Ecologie	2013	Left	386	803	307	388
Fondation Robert Schuman	1991	Liberals	518	1,568	–	–
Institut Montaigne	2000	Liberals	632	3,678	501	2,327
Generation Libre	2013	Liberals	178	57	123	32
IFRAP	1985	Right	75	3,220	65	2,661
Fondapol	2004	Right	595	1,785	449	824
Groupement de recherches et d’études pour la civilisation européenne	1969	Radical right	58	2,140	27	1,007
Fondation Polemia pour l’identité la sécurité et les libertés européennes	2002	Radical right	–	3,723	–	1,111
Institut Thomas More	2004	Radical right	527	946	271	702
Institut des Libertés	2012	Radical right	76	1,069	50	946
		Total	12,405	30,066	8,921	18,609

**Notes:** This table reports the number of staff and contributors. The figures refer to the number of occurrences in our data, not the unique number of staff members or contributors. An individual who contributes once each year between 2010 and 2019 will account for 9 occurrences of contributors. The number of occurrences after the merge with INA data is smaller because some contributors and staff members never appear in the media.

Table D.3: Summary statistics: Journalists who work for multiple owners between 2002 and 2020 vs. journalists who do not

	Unique owner	Multiple owners	Diff/se
<b>Demographics</b>			
=1 if journalist is female	0.43	0.40	0.03*** (0.01)
Date of birth	1960	1965	-6*** (1)
=1 if born in Paris	0.22	0.22	0.00 (0.02)
<b>Education</b>			
=1 if highest degree is bachelor	0.17	0.14	0.03 (0.03)
=1 if highest degree is master	0.76	0.80	-0.04 (0.03)
=1 if highest degree is PhD	0.04	0.04	0.00 (0.01)
=1 if journalism school	0.14	0.15	-0.01 (0.02)
=1 if Business school	0.00	0.00	0.00 (0.00)
=1 if Sciences Po	0.00	0.00	0.00 (0.00)
=1 if Engineering school	0.01	0.00	0.01 (0.00)
=1 if ENA	0.00	0.01	-0.00 (0.00)
Observations	13,842		

**Notes:** The table presents summary statistics on journalists who work for multiple owners. An observation is a journalist.



Table D.4: Explanatory power of the journalist fixed effects – Sample of journalists working for multiple owners between 2002 and 2020, Speaking time shares calculated in appearances of *all the guests*

(a) Right-Left difference				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Show characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
DoW FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Channel FE		✓	✓	✓
Owner FE			✓	✓
Journalist FE				✓
Observations	864,582	864,582	864,582	864,415
Clusters (journalists)	4,187	4,187	4,187	4,020
R-squared	0.012	0.015	0.015	0.025
Adjusted R-squared	0.011	0.014	0.014	0.019
(b) Far right				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Show characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
DoW FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Channel FE		✓	✓	✓
Owner FE			✓	✓
Journalist FE				✓
Observations	864,582	864,582	864,582	864,415
Clusters (journalists)	4,187	4,187	4,187	4,020
R-squared	0.019	0.025	0.026	0.041
Adjusted R-squared	0.018	0.024	0.025	0.035
(c) Far left				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Show characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
DoW FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Channel FE		✓	✓	✓
Owner FE			✓	✓
Journalist FE				✓
Observations	864,582	864,582	864,582	864,415
Clusters (journalists)	4,187	4,187	4,187	4,020
R-squared	0.017	0.023	0.023	0.036
Adjusted R-squared	0.016	0.022	0.022	0.030

**Notes:** The table reports the estimated R-squared when estimating equation (1) with show characteristics and week and dow-of-the-week fixed effects (Column (1)), and channel fixed effects (Column (2)), and owner fixed effects (Column (3)), and journalists fixed effects (Column (4)). An observation is a journalist-show. The data covers the time period ranging from January 1st 2002 to December 31st 2020. It includes the following 16 television channels: TF1, France 2, France 3, Canal+, France 5, M6, ARTE, C8/D8, TMC, France 4, BFM TV, I-Télé/CNews, LCI, LCP/Public Sénat, and 10 radio stations: France Inter, France Info, France Culture, and RTL, RMC, Europe 1, Radio Classique, and BFM Business. The upper table D.4a reports the results for the right-left difference in the speaking time shares, the middle table D.4b for the radical right speaking time, and the bottom table D.4c for the radical left speaking time. Speaking time shares are calculated in appearances of all the guests.

Table D.5: Explanatory power of the journalist fixed effects – Sample of journalists working for multiple owners between 2002 and 2020, Speaking time shares calculated in appearances of guests with a political lean (only including the politicians)

(a) Right-Left difference				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Show characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
DoW FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Channel FE		✓	✓	✓
Owner FE			✓	✓
Journalist FE				✓
Observations	398,543	398,543	398,543	398,236
Clusters (journalists)	3,947	3,947	3,947	3,640
R-squared	0.027	0.029	0.030	0.047
Adjusted R-squared	0.024	0.027	0.027	0.035
(b) Far right				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Show characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
DoW FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Channel FE		✓	✓	✓
Owner FE			✓	✓
Journalist FE				✓
Observations	398,543	398,543	398,543	398,236
Clusters (journalists)	3,947	3,947	3,947	3,640
R-squared	0.029	0.031	0.032	0.047
Adjusted R-squared	0.027	0.029	0.029	0.036
(c) Far left				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Show characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
DoW FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Channel FE		✓	✓	✓
Owner FE			✓	✓
Journalist FE				✓
Observations	398,543	398,543	398,543	398,236
Clusters (journalists)	3,947	3,947	3,947	3,640
R-squared	0.022	0.024	0.024	0.042
Adjusted R-squared	0.020	0.022	0.022	0.031

**Notes:** The table reports the estimated R-squared when estimating equation (1) with show characteristics and week and dow-of-the-week fixed effects (Column (1)), and channel fixed effects (Column (2)), and owner fixed effects (Column (3)), and journalists fixed effects (Column (4)). An observation is a journalist-show. The data covers the time period ranging from January 1st 2002 to December 31st 2020. It includes the following 16 television channels: TF1, France 2, France 3, Canal+, France 5, M6, ARTE, C8/D8, TMC, France 4, BFM TV, I-Télé/CNews, LCI, LCP/Public Sénat, and 10 radio stations: France Inter, France Info, France Culture, and RTL, RMC, Europe 1, Radio Classique, and BFM Business. The upper table D.5a reports the results for the right-left difference in the speaking time shares, the middle table D.5b for the radical right speaking time, and the bottom table D.5c for the radical left speaking time. Speaking time shares are calculated in appearances of guests with a political lean; only the politicians are included.

Table D.6: Explanatory power of the journalist fixed effects, Using the inverse hyperbolic sine

(a) Right-Left difference				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Show characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
DoW FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Channel FE		✓	✓	✓
Owner FE			✓	✓
Journalist FE				✓
Observations	674,539	674,539	674,539	674,539
Clusters (journalists)	2,798	2,798	2,798	2,798
R-squared	0.041	0.046	0.046	0.064
Adjusted R-squared	0.040	0.045	0.045	0.059
(b) Far right				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Show characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
DoW FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Channel FE		✓	✓	✓
Owner FE			✓	✓
Journalist FE				✓
Observations	674,539	674,539	674,539	674,539
Clusters (journalists)	2,798	2,798	2,798	2,798
R-squared	0.055	0.061	0.061	0.079
Adjusted R-squared	0.054	0.060	0.060	0.075
(c) Far left				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Show characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
DoW FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Channel FE		✓	✓	✓
Owner FE			✓	✓
Journalist FE				✓
Observations	674,539	674,539	674,539	674,539
Clusters (journalists)	2,798	2,798	2,798	2,798
R-squared	0.055	0.061	0.061	0.079
Adjusted R-squared	0.054	0.060	0.060	0.075

**Notes:** The Table reports the R-squared and Adjusted R-squared of the estimation of model (1). Observations are at the show-journalist level, and time period is September 2006-August 2018. Column (1) only control for the show characteristics, the week and the day-of-the-week fixed effects. In Column (2) we add the channel fixed effects, in Column (3) the owner fixed effects, and in Column (4) the journalist fixed effects. The upper Table D.6a reports these estimates for the right-left difference, the middle Table ?? for the far right, and the bottom Table D.6c for the far left.

Table D.7: Effect of the Bolloré takeover on political families time shares

(a) Politicians and politically engaged non-politicians (PENOPs)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Classified	Rights-Lefts	Lefts	Rights
Bolloré × After	-1.227	5.088*	-2.984	2.104
	(5.068)	(2.467)	(3.352)	(2.046)
R-sq	0.033	0.073	0.134	0.420
Within R-sq	0.032	0.091	0.100	0.000
N	90	90	90	90
# channels	6	6	6	6
$\bar{y}$ Bolloré	20.87	-10.75	50.89	40.14
(b) Only politicians				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Classified	Rights-Lefts	Lefts	Rights
Bolloré × After	-3.520	3.755	-2.801	0.953
	(4.761)	(4.636)	(4.787)	(1.247)
R-sq	0.020	0.124	0.149	0.519
Within R-sq	0.447	0.075	0.164	0.234
N	90	90	90	90
# channels	6	6	6	6
$\bar{y}$ Bolloré	16.07	-8.95	51.38	42.43
(c) Only politically engaged non-politicians (PENOPs)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Classified	Rights-Lefts	Lefts	Rights
Bolloré × After	2.293	17.81	-9.197	8.613
	(1.860)	(10.09)	(5.608)	(5.122)
R-sq	0.337	0.223	0.215	0.192
Within R-sq	0.119	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	90	90	90	90
# channels	6	6	6	6
$\bar{y}$ Bolloré	4.8	-17.82	51.86	34.04

**Notes:** The table reports difference in differences estimates from Equation 2. The sample used includes the 15 television and radio stations for which we have good data coverage until 2020. Standard errors are clustered at the channel level. Time shares are weighted by the average audience of television and radio for the corresponding time slot. Political family time shares are computed as a proportion of the total time of politically classified guests. \* 10%, \*\* 5%, \*\*\* 1%.

Table D.8: Effect of the Bolloré takeover on political families time shares, heterogeneity by channel

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Classified	Rights-Lefts	Lefts	Rights
Canal+ $\times$ After	-9.261** (2.852)	1.874 (2.056)	-1.206 (3.502)	0.668 (2.127)
C8 D8 $\times$ After	3.057 (3.665)	5.777 (2.957)	-5.775 (4.621)	0.00218 (2.993)
CNews I-Télé $\times$ After	4.124 (2.230)	7.706*** (1.777)	-3.313 (3.551)	4.393* (1.957)
R-sq	0.150	0.080	0.140	0.427
Within R-sq	0.030	0.069	0.120	0.002
N	90	90	90	90
# channels	6	6	6	6
$\bar{y}$ Canal+	19.07	-21.96	57.01	35.05
$\bar{y}$ C8	3.82	4.36	43.44	47.8
$\bar{y}$ CNews	39.72	-14.64	52.22	37.58

**Notes:** The table reports difference in differences estimates from Equation 2. The sample used includes the 15 television and radio stations for which we have good data coverage until 2020. Standard errors are clustered at the channel level. Time shares are weighted by the average audience of television and radio for the corresponding time slot. Political family time shares are computed as a proportion of the total time of politically classified guests. \* 10%, \*\* 5%, \*\*\* 1%.

Table D.9: Effect of the Bolloré takeover on political families time shares, heterogeneity by channel and political families

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Radical left	Greens	Left	Liberals	Right	Radical right
Canal+ $\times$ After	-0.943 (1.064)	-1.190 (0.648)	0.927 (2.863)	-0.386 (5.393)	0.816 (2.644)	-0.149 (0.853)
C8 D8 $\times$ After	2.891 (1.593)	-2.485** (0.708)	-6.181 (4.704)	5.592 (7.213)	-2.690 (3.493)	2.692** (1.045)
CNews I-Télé $\times$ After	-0.115 (0.817)	-0.584 (0.669)	-2.614 (2.775)	-2.562 (5.464)	-1.738 (2.456)	6.130*** (0.688)
R-sq	0.545	0.255	0.286	0.433	0.557	0.555
Within R-sq	0.291	0.320	0.311	0.286	0.117	0.485
N	90	90	90	90	90	90
# channels	6	6	6	6	6	6
$\bar{y}$ Canal+	7.3	6.28	43.43	5.25	26.72	8.33
$\bar{y}$ C8	5.7	2.01	35.73	3.09	42.97	4.83
$\bar{y}$ CNews	5.36	8.51	38.35	8.06	30.18	7.4

**Notes:** The table reports difference in differences estimates from Equation 2. The sample used includes the 15 television and radio stations for which we have good data coverage until 2020. Standard errors are clustered at the channel level. Time shares are weighted by the average audience of television and radio for the corresponding time slot. Political family time shares are computed as a proportion of the total time of politically classified guests. \* 10%, \*\* 5%, \*\*\* 1%.

## **E Robustness checks**


In this section, we present the results of a number of robustness checks that we perform in the core of the article.

### **E.1 Exhaustive data**

In this section, we show that our main findings – and descriptive evidence – are robust to only considering the 15 television channels and radio stations that are fully documented (i.e. TF1, France 2, France 3, Canal+, France 5, M6, ARTE, C8/D8, TMC, I-Tél é/CNews, LCI, LCP/Public Sénat, France Inter, France Info and France Culture.) and focusing on the sub-period September 1st, 2006 to August 31st, 2018.


## E.2 Including the Summer

In our preferred specification, we drop the summer months (July and August). In this appendix, we show that all our main results are robust to including it.



(a) Only politicians – All time periods

(b) Only politicians – Dropping mandatory speaking time for government




(c) All politically-classified guests – All time periods

(d) All politically-classified guests – Dropping mandatory speaking time for government.


**Notes:** The data covers the time period ranging from September 1st 2006 to August 31st 2008. It includes the following 14 television channels: TF1, France 2, France 3, Canal+, France 5, M6, ARTE, C8/D8, TMC, France 4, BFM TV, I-Tél é/CNews, LCI, LCP/Public Sénat, and 8 radio stations: France Inter, France Info, France Culture, RTL, RMC, Europe 1, Radio Classique, and BFM Business. Speaking time is aggregated at the season level, that is from September 1st to August 31st.

Figure E.1: Evolution of the speaking time of the guests, depending on their political affiliation – Robustness check: Including the Summer







(a) Only politicians – All time periods



(b) Only politicians – Dropping mandatory speaking time for government



(c) All politically-classified guests – All time periods




(d) All politically-classified guests – Dropping mandatory speaking time for government


**Notes:** The data covers the time period ranging from September 1st 2006 to August 31st 2008. It includes the following 14 television channels: TF1, France 2, France 3, Canal+, France 5, M6, ARTE, C8/D8, TMC, France 4, BFM TV, I-Tél é/CNews, LCI, LCP/Public Sénat, and 8 radio stations: France Inter, France Info, France Culture, RTL, RMC, Europe 1, Radio Classique, and BFM Business. Speaking time is aggregated at the season level, that is from September 1st to August 31st.

Figure E.2: Speaking time of the political families, depending on the channels – Robustness check: Including the Summer

### E.3 Drop electoral periods when speaking time more strictly regulated by the CSA



(a) Party time share over time, using only politicians – All politicians included



(b) Party time share over time, using only politicians – Dropping mandatory speaking time for government

**Notes:** These descriptive statistics are based on our sample of television channels and radio stations from September 2006 to August 2018. Speaking time is aggregated at the season level, that is from September 1st to June 30th, we exclude summer months (see online Appendix Figure E.1 for a similar figure including the Summer).

Figure E.3: Guests' political affiliation with and without government

## References

**Benson, Rodney, Matthew Powers, and Timothy Neff**, “Public Media Autonomy and Accountability: Best and Worst Policy Practices in 12 Leading Democracies,” *International Journal of Communication*, 2017, 11 (0).